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The Real Value of EqualityRobert Jubb, University of LeicesterThis article investigates how political theorists and philosophers should understand egalitarian political demands in
light of the increasingly important realist critique of much of contemporary political theory and philosophy. It sug-
or realists,gests, ﬁrst, that what Martin O’Neill has called non-intrinsic egalitarianism is, in one form at least, a potentially realis-
tic egalitarian political project and, second, that realists may be compelled to impose an egalitarian threshold on state
claims to legitimacy under certain circumstances. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological re-
quirements because it does not have to assume an unavailable moral consensus since it can focus on widely acknowl-
edged bads rather than contentious claims about the good. Further, an appropriately formulated non-intrinsic egali-
tarianism may be a minimum requirement of an appropriately realistic claim by a political order to authoritatively
structure some of its members’ lives. Without at least a threshold set of egalitarian commitments, a political order seems
unable to be transparent to many of its worse-off members under a plausible construal of contemporary conditions.
his article discusses the relation between the increas- tics is or the signiﬁcance of the goods it provides. FT ingly important realist critique of much contemporarypolitical theory and one of realism’s favorite targets— politics involves ﬁnding ways to live together despite deep andunresolvable moral disagreement, profound conﬂicts of inter-nation
he Lea commitment to high levels of material equality as in some
way central for the acceptability of a political order. I make two
main claims about that relation. I argue ﬁrst that what Martin
O’Neill has called non-intrinsic egalitarianism is, in one form
at least, a potentially realistic egalitarian political project and,
second, that realists may be compelled to impose an egalitar-
ian threshold on state claims to legitimacy under certain cir-
cumstances. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism can meet realism’s
methodological requirements because it does not have to as-
sume an unavailable moral consensus since it can focus on
widely acknowledged bads rather than contentious claims
about the good. Further, an appropriately formulated non-
intrinsic egalitarianism may be a minimum requirement of an
appropriately realistic claim by a political order to authorita-
tively structure some of its members’ lives. Without at least
a threshold set of egalitarian commitments, a political order
seems unable to be transparent to many of its worse-off mem-
bers under a plausible construal of contemporary conditions.
Realists criticize the moralism they see as dominant in con-
temporary political theory for failing to understand what poli-
Robert Jubb, Lecturer in Political Theory, Department of Politics and Inter
UK; robert.jubb@leicester.ac.uk.
This article was ﬁrst drafted during an Early Career Fellowship from t
1. There have been a number of attacks on luck egalitarianism which do not
here. The most well-known of these is probably Anderson (1999). My own disc
The Journal of Politics, volume 77, number 3. Published online April 14, 2015.
q 2015 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-
This content downloaded from 134.225.109.1
All use subject to JSTOR Test, and an inability to consistently act morally (see, e.g., Rossi
and Sleat 2014, 691). Politics is for them centrally concerned
with providing a civil order that is “sine qua non for every
other political good” (Galston 2010, 408). Views that assume
away the problems that political institutions are supposed to
solve are not in fact political at all. For example, even propo-
nents of luck egalitarianism—the view that equality requires
all and only outcomes derived from circumstance rather than
choice to be equalized—recognize that luck egalitarianism lands
us “up to our necks” in one of the most apparently intractable
of philosophical problems, that of free will (Cohen 1989, 934).
Using it as the basis of a political regime would require, at a
minimum, either monolithic and unimaginably intrusive co-
ercive state power or the kind of agreement on the metaphysics
of causation that is ruled by the continued existence of politics
as a sphere of human activity. In that sense, it is not a political
doctrine, whatever merits it may have as an account of how,
ideally, we ought to relate to each other.1
In cases like that of luck egalitarianism, realism’s case
seems robust. Such doctrines are simply not, in the relevant
al Relations, University of Leicester, University Road, Leicester LE1 7RH,
verhulme Trust (ECF-2011-425).
rely on the idea that it is not sufﬁciently political in the sense that I mean i
ussion of that debate can be found in Jubb (2011).
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sense, political. Theories like luck egalitarianism assume
levels of moral agreement among those to whom they are
chological resources. Here, I argue that, in their standard
form, egalitarianisms of the sort Martin O’Neill has called
680 / Real Value of Equality Robert Jubbsupposed to apply which would, independently of their ap-
plication, remove the difﬁculties with which they are sup-
posed to deal. Those theories’ failure to answer what Ber-
nardWilliams called the “ﬁrst political question”means they
are, in Patrick Tomlin’s terms, circular recommendations
(Tomlin 2012, 43 ff.; Williams 2005a). However, that real-
ism can successfully show that some doctrines claiming to be
political philosophy are nothing of the sort does not mean
we know what we should use in their place. Realists focus
on the goods of civil peace, and under which circumstances
and through which means it makes sense to try to achieve
them. Developing a positive realist political theory then will
depend on how much and what sort of civil order we need,
and so steering between a crude Hobbesian insistence that
might is right and the moralistic demand that political
power realize the highest moral ideals, whether we can agree
on what those are or not.
In this article, I explore one aspect of that question by
considering the issue of how egalitarian realism can and
should be. Realists have typically been resistant to the focus
in contemporary political philosophy on questions of dis-
tributive justice, urging that the more properly political
question of legitimacy must at least come ﬁrst.2 The elabo-
rate and highly articulated egalitarian commitments of the-
orists like G. A. Cohen or Ronald Dworkin are often rightly
seen as exactly the sort of thing against which realists warn.
Still, I will argue that certain egalitarian commitments are com-
patible with realism’s emphasis on legitimacy and, more, may
be required by it. Realists should reject egalitarianisms whose
implementation depends on achieving levels of self-sacriﬁce
or moral agreement that would radically alter the kind of
political authorities to which we are subject. Demanding that
we live according to a principle of community that requires
us to serve others for the sake of serving them and not for
our own purposes, as G. A. Cohen (2009) does, for example,
is clearly ruled out. It asks for too much both in terms of mo-
tivation and of acceptance of controversial philosophical ide-
als to make sense as a political prescription.
However, not all egalitarianisms present in contemporary
political philosophy make those sorts of demands. In order
to be acceptable to realists, an egalitarianism has to make use
of justiﬁcatory resources that acknowledge the ubiquity of
moral disagreement and conﬂicts of interest in politics. It
must draw on a more circumscribed set of moral and psy-
2. Enzo Rossi (2012) has even argued that moralist theories cannot
apply their own prescriptions of justice without ﬁrst having a theory of
legitimacy .
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containing rather than imagining away disagreement (2008).
Non-intrinsic egalitarianisms’ calls for high levels of material
equality are based on widely experienced and understood
harms of status, and so in general this class of egalitarian-
ism does not require moral resources on which it is un-
realistic to expect political orders to be able to draw. Difﬁ-
culties emerge when either the egalitarianism makes appeal
to a positive moral ideal, or in circumstances where the con-
stituencies for such egalitarianism have been marginalized,
split, or attempt to satisfy their demands for self-respect
in other ways. The ﬁrst of these difﬁculties can easily be
avoided though, and whether the second applies is a matter
of political judgment that I am not best-placed to make.
At the level of generality with which I am concerned, non-
intrinsic egalitarianism is compatible with realism.
Indeed, some form of non-intrinsic egalitarianism may
be required if we understand the criteria for legitimacy in the
way at least one realist suggests we should around here and
now. There are, at least for Bernard Williams, two ways
that a political order can fail to be legitimate. As examples
of what politics is supposed to replace, some political orders
do not really deserve that name. They involve not the pro-
vision of civil order but “one lot of people terrorizing an-
other lot of people” (Williams 2005a, 5). As Williams puts
it, one lot of people terrorizing another lot of people is not
a “political situation” but “rather, the situation which the
existence of the political is in ﬁrst place supposed to alle-
viate” (5). Slavery and the relationship between the Spar-
tans and the Helots, Williams claims, fail to reach this
standard. Yet an order may not be an example of “inter-
nalized warfare” and still fail to be legitimate (5). What
Williams called the ﬁrst political question may be Hobbes’s,
but as he notes, that does not mean that we have to take
Hobbes’s answer for it to be adequate (4). A political order
is not legitimate simply because it is a political order and
not merely a particularly successful protection racket or
other form of “successful domination” (5). Avoiding treat-
ing groups of those over whom the state presumes a right
to command as nothing more than recalcitrant instruments
is not enough to vindicate that claim to authority. Political
orders must make sense to those over whom they claim
authority, and when we interpret what that implies for us
in a certain way, that rules out political orders with the kinds
of hierarchies against which non-intrinsic egalitarianism in-
veighs. Such orders do not provide those at the bottom of the
hierarchies they create with an adequate return on their sub-
mission to them and so fail to be legitimate for them. Indeed,20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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realists’ commitment to a minimally egalitarian claim that au-
thorities need to attempt to justify themselves to those over
others advocate to make sense to and avoid placing too
muchmotivational stress on agents like us, with our conﬂicts
Volume 77 Number 3 July 2015 / 681whom they claim authority turns out, in particular circum-
stances at least, to have more substantive conclusions than
theymight expect.
NON-INTRINSIC EGALITARIANISM AS A
POLITICAL DOCTRINE
The term non-intrinsic egalitarianism was coined by Mar-
tin O’Neill to cover a range of egalitarian positions. What
distinguishes non-intrinsic egalitarian positions is that their
commitment to the value of distributive equality is neither
weakly instrumental nor intrinsic. Rather than valuing more
equal holdings of goods because such a distribution is a
means to an end or because it is valuable in and of itself,
non-intrinsic egalitarians value it because of a set of social
relations to which it is closely connected. High levels of dis-
tributive equality are required to avoid “the badness of ser-
vility, exploitation, domination, and differences in status”
(2008, 130).3 It is a “deep social fact,” O’Neill claims, that
greater equality of condition will typically be both necessary
and sufﬁcient to avoid “domination and stigmatizing dif-
ferences in status . . . offensive to the dignity and standing
of human agents” (130). Five related kinds of harms that a
collection of broadly egalitarian political theorists and moral
philosophers mention as motivating their egalitarianism clus-
ter in such a way that removing or reducing differences in in-
come and wealth will reliably act to prevent them.4 Although
of course there are other interesting issues raised by O’Neill’s
discussion, the question here is whether non-intrinsic egali-
tarianism is compatible with a realist emphasis on the un-
avoidability of disagreement in politics. In the remainder of
this section, I suggest that realists can be non-intrinsic egali-
tarians as long as some presentational changes are made and
some satisfactory answers to a range of mainly empirical
questions about the political possibilities genuinely open to
us can be found.
A non-intrinsic egalitarianism will be vulnerable to attack
by realists if its justiﬁcation and implementation depend
on moral or psychological resources unavailable in the cir-
cumstances of politics generally or the political situation
in which its particular audience ﬁnd themselves. Can we
reasonably expect the kinds of political orders O’Neill and
3. Like O’Neill, I ignore demands for equality associated with absolute
deprivation, since equality is, after all, about your position related to that
of others.
4. O’Neill (2010) discusses the relation of non-intrinsic egalitarianism
to recent social epidemiology, which similarly suggests that the harms of
inequality cluster and are at root related to status hierarchies.
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consistently govern ourselves through reason alone? Clearly,
agents much like us have lived and do live in societies with
much higher levels of material equality than are currently
experienced in, for example, the United Kingdom or the United
States. The concentration of income and wealth among the
richest in these societies is higher than most other similarly
economically developed states and signiﬁcantly higher than
in a cluster of such states in Northern Europe, while there has
a been a trend toward higher inequality among more or less
all such states since the mid-1980s (see, e.g., OECD 2011).
Unless we are to believe that Swedes were particularly saintly
or oppressed in the 30 or so years after WorldWar II, there is
no reason to think that non-intrinsic egalitarianism as such
fails to meet Bernard Williams’s criteria of using “defensible
political power” to apply “aspirations for equality and a sense
of community . . . to a world which is signiﬁcantly driven
by other sorts of motivations” (1997, 57). A political order
that avoids domination and status hierarchies, and the ser-
vility, lack of self-respect, and mutual indifference and even
hostility that go with them through high levels of material
equality does not require members whose altruism is beyond
that of which humans are typically capable. Equally, such
an order does not have to rely on coercive police power to
sustain itself but can, in spite of their differences, rest on its
citizens’ acceptance of the way it structures their relations.
In themost general terms then, as long asO’Neill’s deep social
fact holds, non-intrinsic egalitarianism articulates a political
demand in a way that G. A. Cohen’s demand that our political
communities must realize a profoundly self-sacriﬁcing prin-
ciple of community does not.
However, the details of the claims that non-intrinsic
egalitarians make matter. O’Neill tends to present the view
as drawing on “a complex social and political ideal of how
people should best live together,” which then provides an
“account of the plurality of ways in which inequality can be
bad” (2008, 139). “A complex social and political ideal of
how people should best live together” will, though, because
of its complexity and ambition, inevitably be subject to ex-
tensive disagreement in the circumstances of politics. Rather
than a mechanism to contain disagreement to provide civil
order and the accompanying peace and security, it asserts
the superiority of a particular vision of the good life and
bases a political order around it, ignoring its unacceptabil-
ity to many of that order’s members and the risk its ascen-
dancy poses to civil order. Putting it in Rawlsian rather than
conventionally realist terms, as an account of how best to
live together, its comprehensiveness will make it subject to20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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the burdens of judgment and mean it is not available as the
basis of an overlapping consensus. Under what Rawls called
and economic inequalities” are “serious evils and the atti-
tudes they engender great vices” and only then goes on to
682 / Real Value of Equality Robert Jubb“the fact of oppression,” it would require “the oppressive use
of state power” to serve as the basis of a political community
(2005, 37).
Rather than O’Neill’s perfectionist non-intrinsic egalitar-
ianism, it would be better to instead emphasize the way that
non-intrinsic egalitarianism links together a set of widely
understood and acknowledged harms to form a case for
high levels of material equality. In political terms at least, the
“badness of servility, exploitation, domination, and differ-
ences in status” is not best “understood by virtue of the con-
trasting value of certain kinds of fraternal, egalitarian so-
cial relations” (2008, 130). Much as the liberalism of fear
is founded on “the only certainly universal materials of pol-
itics . . . power, powerlessness, fear, cruelty,” non-intrinsic
egalitarianism should be seen as based on avoiding forc-
ing people into positions of degradation that it is easy to agree
are wrong or undesirable (Williams 2005b, 59). Humiliation,
craven behaviour, invidious hierarchies of esteem, and the
like are bad in a variety of ways. Those who suffer them tend
not to like them and to be made unhappy by them. Both
because of the dissatisfaction and even misery that accom-
panies them and because of the way they subordinate some
to others and so fail to respect their agency, status inequal-
ities can also be seen as attacks on human dignity. Even
more, the experience of being treated as less than others also
seems to be bad for human health in general, as the stress of
being the tool of another and so having conﬁdence in your
own abilities undermined appears to have damaging effects
for the cardiovascular system in particular (see Marmot
2004; O’Neill 2010). At least in political terms, the ideal is
supported by the badness of what it avoids, rather than the
other way round. We cannot expect enough agreement on
an egalitarian ideal for it to make sense of a political order
to that order’s members, while it at least seems reasonable
to hope that they may accept an order’s explanation in terms
of the harms against which it aims to protect them.
In this sense, to be acceptable to realists, non-intrinsic
egalitarianism should be described as a negative ideal, with
its appeal based on what it prevents. Although this is not
how O’Neill presents the view, it is more faithful to the
theorists whose views he is trying to reconstruct as well as
appropriately political. Typically, one of the works O’Neill
refers to in characterizing non-intrinsic egalitarianism is
called “The Diversity of Objections to Inequality” (2008,
122, n. 10).5 A long passage O’Neill approvingly quotes from
Rawls, for example, ﬁrst observes that the “effects of social
5. The reference is to Scanlon (2003).This content downloaded from 134.225.109.1
All use subject to JSTOR Tdiscuss how these problems can be remedied by a norm of
equal citizenship favouring distributive mechanisms which
only allow beneﬁts when all receive them (O’Neill 2008,
126; Rawls 2001, 130–32). Similarly, Rousseau’s Discourse
on the Origins of Inequality, which both Rawls and O’Neill
acknowledge as inﬂuential, seems better characterized as con-
cerned with avoiding harm than realizing an ideal (O’Neill
2008, 129; Rawls 2001, 131, n. 50). The human desire for
standing in the eyes of others is terrible because, left un-
checked, it generates a crippling and debasing obsession
with our position in various rankings that which can never
satisfy any but those at their very top and continually feeds
cycles of violence and domination (Rousseau [1750/1755]
1997a, 130–222). Amour-propre must be controlled not be-
cause doing so will achieve the ultimate good, but because
otherwise little or nothing of any real value will exist.
This also changes the role of O’Neill’s deep social fact
connecting equality of status and equality of condition.
Rather than forming an especially strong connection be-
tween material equality and a complex social ideal, the deep
social fact now has to form such a connection between ma-
terial equality and the avoidance of various widely agreed
upon harms. This seems to have two beneﬁts. First, whereas
different goods tend to exclude each other, particularly the
more fully they are realized, so that, for example, a life of
control and moderation may not be very open to new ex-
periences, these harms are connected and tend to cluster
together. A low status leads to being dominated, which leads
to being servile, which undermines conﬁdence in judgment
and capacities. Evidence presented in favour of the deep
social fact is consequently more widely acceptable and less
vulnerable to challenges about its relevance to the values
that are expected to be achieved. The question of conﬂict
between equality and liberty, for example, is more difﬁcult
to raise because being dominated is straightforwardly bad
for both.
Second, and relatedly, there is social scientiﬁc evidence
suggesting that greater material equality does connect in
something like the relevant way to avoiding harms. Richard
Wilkinson and Kate Pickett show high levels of correlation
between a wide range of harms and income inequality in
The Spirit Level, arguing that this is explained by the effect
that income inequality has on status hierarchies, which then
cause the poor outcomes correlated with income inequality
(2009). Although they are able to correlate higher levels of
trust with income equality, higher levels of trust alone do
not count as realization of an egalitarian ideal. The deep so-
cial fact establishing the relation between non-intrinsic egal-20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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itarianism as a negative ideal is better established than the
analogous claim in non-intrinsic egalitarianism presented as
sacriﬁce oneself in pursuit of it may be connected to various
kinds of excellences, which we would rather not our soci-
Volume 77 Number 3 July 2015 / 683a positive ideal.
Negative non-intrinsic egalitarianism has a range of ad-
vantages over positive non-intrinsic egalitarianism then, par-
ticularly in terms of its ﬁt with realism as I understand it. It
is appropriately political, not drawing on unavailable moral
agreement, and has better grounded claims about the rela-
tion between particular social forms and the values it tries to
achieve, as well as plausibly being a more accurate charac-
terization of the relevant tradition. In particular, not relying
on controversial claims about what is desirable about cer-
tain states of affairs or valuable in human life makes it com-
patible with realism’s general emphasis on the importance
of disagreement in understanding politics. Realism is not just
about the character of politics in general though. It also em-
phasizes the importance of situated reasoning, which draws
on the resources for containing disagreement found in par-
ticular circumstances (see, e.g., Rossi and Sleat 2014, 694).
There are no political agents in the abstract, only concrete
ones in particular situations, so unless non-intrinsic egali-
tarianism can show that it responds to the details of a real
situation, it will still be faced with the question of for what
and whom it is. Wilkinson and Pickett suggest that the egal-
itarianism they advocate can respond to worries about the
disappearance of community and high levels of acquisitive-
ness and alienation, but there are at least three worries about
whether it represents a real option here and now.
These are complex issues with which I do not have the
space to deal here, and to which solutions will most probably
require collaboration with scholars with other kinds of ex-
pertise. However, even if I cannot do more than gesture in
the direction of answers to the following three worries, it
seems worth raising them for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst
of these is that the identiﬁcation of problems and what so-
lutions to them might look like is one of the services one
might hope that political theorists and philosophers would
provide to their colleagues. The second is to be open about
the limits of what I hope to have done with the arguments
I have made here. It would be dishonest to pretend that I
have met all the demands that realists might properly make
of an egalitarian political theory simply by showing that
it can deal with conﬂict and disagreement in the abstract.
With these caveats in mind, then, let me point in the di-
rection of what I cannot do here.
First, there is a concern about non-intrinsic egalitarian-
ism’s costs. One of the symptoms of the degrading struggle
for status Rousseau found in the societies around him was
an urge “to renounc[e] life in order to acquire immortality”
([1762] 1997a, 187). That desire for glory and willingness toThis content downloaded from 134.225.109.1
All use subject to JSTOR Teties were without, or which we need for our lives to be
meaningful. Perhaps without damaging competition over
status, we would lose a sense of the importance of some
very great goods which can exclude other values from and
even be destructive for individual human lives. Relatedly,
the desire to distinguish oneself may also be linked to in-
egalitarian societies by fostering and ﬂourishing in an en-
vironment of pluralism. It is clear that Rousseau’s view
that Corsica was the only European nation capable of living
under a genuine social contract was in part motivated by
worries about the sophistication and diversity of other Eu-
ropean societies (1997b, 78 (2.10.6)). Relatively simple so-
cieties are more capable of containing disputes over status
because there are fewer ways of differentiating oneself and
so less opportunity to attempt to gain advantage by open-
ing up a new mode of distinction. Certainly the history of
egalitarian societies suggests that homogeneity and so ex-
clusivity may be important. Declining levels of equality in
Sweden partly coincide with the growth of immigration
from non-Nordic countries and so increases in ethnic and
cultural pluralism, for example (see, e.g., OECD 2011, ﬁg. 1;
Swedish Integration Board 2006, 19). Equally, Bernard Wil-
liams suggests that the solidarity among those who strug-
gled for the British welfare state may have been related to
their “xenophobia, brutality and sexism,” that without that
intolerance he claims was present in, for example, a trade
union movement based around the often very male world
of the industrial working class, the strong demands for ma-
terial equality might have fallen away (1997, 55). The costs
of equality may not, then, be ones that we should pay.
Second, there is the question of whether, politically and
economically, high levels of material equality are possible.
There are two problems here. First, there is the issue of
whether, in the course of normal politics, the beneﬁciaries of
an egalitarian politics can dominate the domestic political
scene to the extent necessary to restructure the content and
distribution of property rights. Even if the challenge of over-
coming domestic barriers to egalitarianism can be over-
come, there is then the further, if not entirely separate,
worry of whether implementing egalitarian policies will not
make a society uncompetitive internationally and so be eco-
nomically unsustainable. Wilkinson and Pickett point to
high levels of trade union membership as one of the stron-
gest drivers of high levels of material equality, yet union
membership has been declining through much of the de-
veloped world under the inﬂuence both of political assaults
and the decline of the traditional heavy and nationalized
industries it thrived in (2009, 245). They also mention the20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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role of crises in creating moments of political opportunity
for egalitarians, but it seems that recent crises have typically
non-intrinsic egalitarianism is not only compatible with,
but may be required by, realism in political theory. If non-
means states can never be full legitimate for realists.
684 / Real Value of Equality Robert Jubbundermined, rather than strengthened, egalitarian political
forces. Despite the recent success of Syrzia in Greece, at the
time of writing, for example, only two of the members
of the G7 have governments led by members of straight-
forwardly left-wing parties. One of these, the Prime Min-
ister of Italy, Matteo Renzi, is anyway from the Christian
Democrat wing of his Democratic Party, while the other,
the French President Francois Hollande, is spectacularly
unpopular. The increasing opening-up of domestic econo-
mies to international markets, perhaps particularly in ﬁ-
nance, may well have signiﬁcantly undermined the scope
for domestic equality.
Third, non-intrinsic egalitarianism will have to make
sense as a way of responding to the concerns of its beneﬁ-
ciaries. Wilkinson and Pickett try to argue that material equality
beneﬁts everyone, but the evidence here is unclear, even in
the strongest case of poor health (see, e.g., Sreenivasan 2009),
and even if it were not, the persistence of voting blocks against
high levels of material equality suggests that plenty of people
value dominating others more than they disvalue being dom-
inated themselves. In the United Kingdom, support for mea-
sures to decrease material inequality is falling with the poorly
off increasingly seen as feckless and responsible for their own
fate (see Hills et al. 2009). Contemporary political conscious-
ness seems to stigmatize various out-groups instead of focusing
on the material inequalities which trouble non-intrinsic egali-
tarians. It is not obvious then that there is a political constitu-
ency for non-intrinsic egalitarianism, perhaps in part because
of the political and economic changes that have made it more
difﬁcult for those intended as its constituency to collectively
exercise self-determination.
It may be, of course, that an egalitarian society does not
have to be boring or illiberal, that imaginative political ac-
tors are capable of gathering a dominant political coalition
behind the demand to realize one, and that the economic
and political environment is less hostile than often supposed
to achieving that goal. Rather than trying to assess the extent
to which these are realistic possibilities here and now,
I merely point to a range of difﬁculties that non-intrinsic
egalitarianism faces in our particular historical situation.
My main concern in this section, after all, has been to show
that at a suitably abstract and general level, non-intrinsic
egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological demands.
It does not have to rely on a set of justiﬁcatory resources
that the mere fact of politics will necessarily deny to it as,
unfortunately, many other prominent forms of contempo-
rary philosophical egalitarianism do. Having shown that, I
now want to move on to consider is the question of whetherThis content downloaded from 134.225.109.1
All use subject to JSTOR Tintrinsic egalitarianism is required, then realists themselves
may be compelled to take up the challenges that contempo-
rary conditions present it or face their theory condemning
itself as unrealistic given anyone who might be reasonably
taken as an audience.
NON-INTRINSIC EGALITARIANISM
AS A LEGITIMACY CONDITION
Realism standardly requires that a political order aims, if
even it may not always succeed, at explaining itself to all those
whom it purports to govern (see Hall 2013).6 It has to try to
answer Hobbes’s ﬁrst political question of “the securing of
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooper-
ation” in a way that makes sense for all those over whom it
claims authority (Williams 2005a, 5). A political order whose
answer to that question is rejected by too many of those it
expects to recognize its right to rule lacks that right to rule
over them. This may well leave the political order’s authority
over its other members fully intact, but equally, its failure to
adequately explain itself to all its members may imperil the
explanation it offers to some towhom itwould otherwisemake
sense.The inability to satisfy a dissidentminority seems tohave
been part of what brought down the former Warsaw Pact re-
gimes, for example. Their failure was not, I think, a failure of
the sort BernardWilliams claims was involved in the Spartan’s
rule over the Helots. That was, onWilliams’s account, no kind
of political order at all, really. As I notedwhen ﬁrstmentioning
Williams’s comments about the Spartans and the Helots, a
political order is not automatically legitimate simply because it
is a political order and not a particularly persistent form of
extortion. There need to be other criteria, criteria of the sort
that perhaps we might see the formerWarsaw Pact regimes as
having ceased tomeet once they fell. Here I argue these criteria
include avoidance of at least some of the harms that non-
intrinsic egalitarianism aims at avoiding. At least under con-
temporary conditions, a political order that routinely subjects
some of its members to the kinds of status harms on which
non-intrinsic egalitarianism focuses cannot offer the objects
of that disrespect a full explanation of why they ought to ac-
cept it. Or so I will claim.
It is important that my question is about social orders
around here and now. Indeed, as we will see, one issue for
the argument I make is how to describe and decide what
counts as “around here and now.” For realists, moralism’s
6. Matt Sleat (2014) has suggested that it is impossible for a political
order to offer a satisfactory explanation to all its members, and that this20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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universalist ambitions are problematic, since they prevent
it from addressing difﬁculties anyone actually faces by re-
tration of aspirations those lacking a full status could have
met, had they not been denied that status. If the hierarchy
Volume 77 Number 3 July 2015 / 685quiring it to ignore the particularities of the situation in
or for which it is formulated. Political situations could not
be entirely sui generis and still be grouped together under
the same label, but they are different enough to require re-
sponses to be distinctive if they are to make sense. A struc-
ture for organizing their lives together that would be ap-
propriate for groups living in precolonial Papua New Guinea
is unlikely to seem persuasive in the United Kingdom today
and vice versa. Focusing on the speciﬁcs of a given context
therefore matters. That focus also avoids certain kinds of
difﬁculties. Consider Rousseau’s Second Discourse and the
philosophical anthropology it provides. Amour-propre has
to be a universal human characteristic which, at least when
combined with certain widespread technological and social
developments, necessarily generates extremely destructive
competition over status.7 Such an account faces a weighty
burden of proof, since it aspires to be true of all people
everywhere. On the other hand, a more contextual account
does not need to consider anything like the same range of
evidence, even if its judgments may have to be correspond-
ingly more ﬁne-grained.
My case for realism needing to be comparatively strongly
egalitarian around here and now depends on an argument
about modernity and its character whose political impor-
tance Bernard Williams stressed throughout his career,
from when he ﬁrst he made it in his 1962 article, “The Idea
of Equality,” up until the very end of his career. The emer-
gence of the idea that someone’s “role in society is itself in
some part the product of social arrangements,” that it is
not “somehow foreordained or inevitable that there should
be these orders,” alters the ways that strongly hierarchical
societies can be justiﬁed (2005c, 105). After the emergence
of that idea, such societies can no longer be seen as satis-
factory from what Williams called the “human point of
view,” which is “concerned primarily with what it is for
that person to live that life,” rather than, say, merely the
roles and titles they occupy (103). In the absence of such
an idea, a strongly hierarchical society could sustain itself
“without compulsion” and retain “human understanding”
between the classes into which it divided its members, since
that division would be unavoidable and so not a sensible fo-
cus of resentment (104). Once such a view spreads, however,
markedly unequal membership becomes a deliberate frus-
7. See, e.g., Rousseau (1997a), where he says that “iron and wheat
civilized men, and ruined Mankind,” and native Americans did not suffer
from the pathologies of corrupt amour-propre precisely because they
lacked agriculture and metallurgy (168).
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by preventing others from coming to see the necessities
they have structured their lives around are nothing of the
sort, and that they have been systematically deluded. This
is not acceptable from the human point of view, not even
to those who beneﬁt from or favour the hierarchy. Re-
ﬂecting on one’s role in society and understanding it not
as divinely ordered or in some other way required makes
systematic inequality unacceptable, at least from a pretty
minimally moral perspective.
Williams’s references there to “a sentimental picture of
the Middle Ages” make it clear that this “reﬂective con-
sciousness” was something he thought his contemporaries
certainly had but those who lived earlier perhaps did not
(2005c, 105). Likewise, in Ethics and the Limits of Philos-
ophy, for example, he says that the extent of our “urge to
reﬂective understanding of society and our activities” makes
recreating the “supposedly contented hierarchical societies
of the past” impossible “since measures would have to be
taken to stop people raising questions that are, by now,
there to be raised” (2011, 181–82). The reference to Weber
and disenchantment he makes there is repeated in Realism
and Moralism in Political Theory, while an obviously sim-
ilar distinctively post-Enlightenment attitude toward truth
is central to the political consequences of a commitment to
it in Truth and Truthfulness (Williams 2002, 231; 2005a, 9;
2011, 183). The most important of those consequences here
is that “the “legitimations” of hierarchical states are per-
ceived to be mythical” (Williams 2005a, 7), and that their
justiﬁcation from the human point of view requires polit-
ical orders to be transparent in the way that JeremyWaldron
has argued is foundational for liberalism (1987; Williams
2005a, 9). Consequently, modern political orders must be
liberal to be legitimate.
For Williams at least then, a central feature of modernity
is that it has destroyed the possibility of justiﬁcations of
social and political order which rest on treating that or-
der as anything but a human construction. A major conse-
quence of this is that the demands on explanations and
justiﬁcations of those orders have increased. Raising “ex-
pectations of what a state can do” by making the social or-
der it sustains a matter of human choice generates “more
demanding standards” for an acceptable answer to the ﬁrst
political question (2005a, 7). Hierarchies will now be the
subject of resentment, and that resentment must be ad-
dressed in terms those who have it can understand. Mem-
bers of societies’ hopes and ambitions may now range be-
yond the social and political position they happen to occupy,20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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and they can sensibly demand an explanation when that
position stiﬂes or frustrates them (2005c, 104). This expla-
(2005, xxi ff.). That principle states that “political power is
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a
686 / Real Value of Equality Robert Jubbnation must address them in something like their terms,
since an order beyond human understanding can no longer
be taken for granted and explanations that do not make
sense to them can and will be rejected. The obverse of dis-
enchantment’s removal of a certain kind of explanation of
hierarchy is the thinning out of the material that legiti-
mations can draw on by increasing the range of people and
perspectives to which they must be accessible. Certain hi-
erarchies cease to be acceptable, and the barriers to justify-
ing any political system are raised.
Obviously, there is a question about the accuracy of
Williams’s account, both of modernity and of its conse-
quences. Both the temporal and the geographical bound-
aries of modernity have to be drawn very tightly to capture
only states whose populations will not accept them unless
they are liberal. Modernity will clearly not include, for ex-
ample, the former Warsaw Pact states before the fall of the
Berlin Wall, let alone rising powers like China. Williams’s
account must be more parochial than it seems to claim.8
Still, it does seem true that in the North Atlantic demo-
cratic states with which Williams was familiar, from the
end of World War II and so for all his adult life, a basically
liberal consensus of the sort he seems to have had in mind
prevailed. Political hierarchies among citizens based on race
or gender have at least usually needed a surface justiﬁcation
in terms that are ostensibly open to all, for example. Re-
stricting my discussion to those North Atlantic democracies,
as in effect much Anglophone political theory and philos-
ophy anyway does, it seems reasonable to accept the set of
constraints Williams sees as characterizing modernity as
bearing on the discussion here.9 How egalitarian are the
requirements of the demand that political orders be trans-
parent generated by the human point of view and disen-
chantment?
One way of understanding the transparency require-
ment would be to contrast it with Rawls’s liberal princi-
ple of legitimacy, another egalitarian norm of transparent
political justiﬁcation allegedly appropriate for modernity
8. I owe being pressed on this point to both Matt Sleat and an
anonymous referee.
9. I am not sure what exactly to say about the scope of Williams’s
account of modernity. It may well rule out teleological ideologies like
Marxism because of the way in which they can appear deterministic. That
may seem an odd implication of an account of modernity. My argument
here is meant to be conditional on Williams’s account of modernity being
accurate in at least the places I suggest it is. Whether it is a satisfactory
account of modernity and what it implies about other societies is beyond
the scope of my inquiry here.
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equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human
reason” (137). States that do not keep to the terms the prin-
ciple lays out lack authority. A realist demand for transpar-
ency will of course reject the idea that endorsement needs to
be “in light of principles and ideal acceptable to common
human reason,” since moral and other disagreement will make
that unlikely, if not impossible. A realist principle of trans-
parency will therefore, presumably unsurprisingly, be less
demanding and less moralistic than Rawls’s liberal princi-
ple of legitimacy.
However, that does not mean that realists can dismiss
the kinds of alienation produced by the status harms which
motivate negative non-intrinsic egalitarianism as irrelevant
to political legitimacy. We have already seen that drawing
on the badness of humiliation and domination does not
require moral or psychological resources realists take to be
necessarily unavailable in political situations, as, for ex-
ample it seems likely the duty of civility Rawls derives from
his principle of legitimacy does (2005, 217). The question is
not whether the harms that non-intrinsic egalitarianism tries
to avoid necessarily imply elaborate moral theorizing that
cannot be the basis of properly political solutions and com-
promises. We know they do not. The question is rather whether
those harms are serious enough that their victims cannot
sensibly regard their political order as having provided them
with the beneﬁts of peace and security, at least on terms they
can understand and at a cost they can accept. Which kinds
of harms might be serious enough to do that?
Here, the human point of view becomes central. Living a
life from the inside gives us certain criteria for assessing
complaints members of an order might make against it.
From that perspective, the avoidable, systematic frustration
or stiﬂing of ambitions, the cramping of a life, is unaccept-
able. This is Williams’s point about “sentimental pictures
of the Middle Ages.” Once the legitimations provided for
their hierarchies come to seem mythological, or worse, ideo-
logical, it becomes impossible to endorse them from the
human point of view since they depend, if not on brute
force, on most of their members being dupes of the re-
mainder. Sympathy for and identiﬁcation with another’s
hopes and aspirations is not, for long at least, compatible
with interactions governed by overwhelming threat advan-
tage or conducted from behind an enchanter’s cloak. A so-
cial structure that is sustained only by coercive power or
mass delusion cannot claim to be concerned with the in-
dividual lives of its members since it crushes or distorts so20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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many of them. Unless a political order treats its members
as entitled to an opportunity for a life that is governed on
rather than a failure for which the agent themselves is re-
sponsible, for example.
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point of view and so will fail to be legitimate, at least under
Williams’s conditions of modernity. Basic respect for indi-
vidual agency is required by a realist principle of transpar-
ency because such respect is a requirement of the human
point of view.
Egalitarian requirements will be included as part of a
realist account of legitimacy, then, if they fall under the
criteria of basic respect for individual agency. The require-
ments of negative non-intrinsic egalitarianism seem well-
placed here. One way of understanding the harms that
egalitarianism tries to forestall and avoid is to see them as
assaults on the dignity of individual agents with their own
lives to lead. Domination involves one person dictating
another’s choices. Servility panders to an oppressor in order
to soften but never loosen their grip. Both are produced by
status hierarchies, which, at least when steep and ubiqui-
tous enough, are themselves public proclamations of the in-
signiﬁcance and unimportance of those further down them.
That the harms with which negative non-intrinsic egalitarian-
ism is concerned are of the right type to matter for whether
a political order can be endorsed from the human point
of view is not enough though. To be incorporated into a
realist account of legitimacy, those harms must be serious
enough to systematically frustrate or constrict the ambi-
tions of those who suffer from them. If they do so, they will
close off the possibility that the system and the way it dis-
tributes its costs and beneﬁts could make sense to the victims
of those harms. Although they will acknowledge they live in
a political order, they will tend to see it as an alien and ex-
ploitative force.
Measuring the gravity of harms inﬂicted by a social sys-
tem is obviously partly an empirical matter. For example,
Wilkinson and Pickett’s claim that violence is correlated
with levels of income inequality, serving there as a proxy for
the gradient of class hierarchies, seems to suggest there is
a correlation between sufﬁciently low status and a level of
alienation such that massive breaches of the political order’s
ostensible structure seem appropriate (2009, 129–44). A
willingness to commit massive breaches of the political or-
der’s ostensible structure is in turn suggestive of it having
systematically frustrated or constricted ambitions in a way
that gives the lie to its claim to authority. As well as that
empirical evidence, though, we need a philosophical frame-
work in which it can be placed. We cannot be sure what does
and does not count as systematic frustration or constric-
tion of ambitions without having at least a grasp on the
question of why something is a frustration or constrictionThis content downloaded from 134.225.109.1
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Reciprocity requires that beneﬁts taken are shared or re-
paid. Unlike reliance on naked coercion or systematic de-
ception, features of a political order that paradigmatically
cause it to fail to be acceptable to all its members, reci-
procity treats others not as obstacles to be pushed or re-
shaped until they ﬁt our plans but as fellow agents. When
we act toward another reciprocally, we treat them as enti-
tled to a return for the beneﬁts we have been able to derive
from them and so as having projects of their own of which
we must take note. Reciprocity is characteristic of the hu-
man point of view then. It operates with the notion of a fair
exchange or return that assistance or forbearance is due
and so takes the sacriﬁces they involve seriously. Operating
with such an idea of fair exchange is a kind of respect for
agency since it requires that other’s projects are treated
with respect, not as mere instruments. Because political
orders are not voluntary, they cannot rely on their mem-
bers having chosen to be treated in a particular way to
ground a claim to respect them as having lives of their
own to lead. Instead, their treatment must be appropriate
on its own terms. It must be reciprocal or, to put it nega-
tively, not be exploitative. Hierarchies that share their ben-
eﬁts among their members are, in this sense at least, accept-
able from the human point of view. It is, after all, precisely
because the beneﬁts of hierarchies that no longer seem fore-
ordained appear to be directed entirely toward those at the
top that those hierarchies cease to be acceptable from the
human point of view.
As this observation shows, judgments of reciprocity
must be relative to some kind of baseline. In the now-
ideological hierarchy, the baseline for judgments of reci-
procity has shifted from one where receiving your due ac-
cording to God’s plan is a beneﬁt to one where it is not,
because God’s plan no longer dictates your role. It would
not make sense then to judge a set of hierarchies reciprocal
simply because the more powerful do not ruthlessly exploit
or oppress the weak, or because they are better off than in the
absence of any political order at all. That those criteria are
met simply shows that this is a political situation, that is not a
situation like that of the Spartans and the Helots, and so that
a political order is being provided at all. Political orders are not
reciprocal and so acceptable from the human point of view
simply because they are political orders. The baseline chosen
has to reﬂect this and so cannot treat the basic goods of or-
der that make systematic mutually beneﬁcial interaction pos-
sible as beneﬁts. These goods must be guaranteed. Under a
broadly liberal political consciousness like ours, these presum-20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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ably include the basic freedoms of person, movement, and
speech and action the liberalism of fear focuses on.
breath we insist on our agnosticism about the different
lives we all lead while with the next we proclaim some worse
12. The British Crime Survey suggests that 6 in 1,000 working age
omen in the United Kingdom were seriously sexually assaulted in 2010/
1 (Chaplin et al. 2011, 66, table 3.02) and there are nearly 21 million such
688 / Real Value of Equality Robert JubbThe issue for the inclusion of an egalitarian threshold in
realist accounts of legitimacy is what counts as a fair return
over that baseline. For people like us, accepting the persistence
of reasonable and irreconcilable disagreement about the
sources of value in human life and that interests do not have
to be malign to clash or compete, access to those beneﬁts is
enough to demonstrate a fair return. We cannot be sure
which speciﬁc opportunities count as beneﬁts, given our
diversity, so tend to defer to those who are to receive them
to judge whether they are a fair return on their submission
to authority. Typically, it would be paternalistic of us to
assume that the plan of life someone followed had resulted
in the systematic frustration or constriction of their ambi-
tions, that for them, it was empty and so no return on their
acceptance of the claims of others. We would not have given
proper respect to them. In this sense, our understanding of the
fair return relevant to the legitimacy of political orders
is relatively minimal.10
However, this realist principle of transparency has, de-
spite its minimalism, egalitarian implications. This is be-
cause it condemns status hierarchies that are systematically
reproduced across a political order, particularly when where
someone is placed in the hierarchy is not the consequence
of conscious choices.11 Such hierarchies are a quasi-ofﬁcial
judgment on the worth of those within them and the lives
they lead. If we systematically treat certain kinds of lives and
activities as markedly superior to others, we must either
ensure that they are really open to all or else accept that we
publicly condemn those who cannot achieve them as infe-
rior. This does not meet the requirement of reciprocity once
what counts as a beneﬁt over and above the bare minimum
of the most basic liberties is no longer a matter on which the
political order may pronounce. Those whom the hierarchies
scorn are confronted by a political order that doubly wrongs
them. Not only does it tell them that their lives are worth
less than those that the hierarchies elevate but, in doing so,
it also undermines their ability to make their lives mean-
ingful by placing that barrier of public contempt in the way
of their doing so. We cannot expect our attempts to make
sense of our political order to be successful if with one
10. Exactly how minimal is not my question here, although of course
it is a sensible one. Discussions over what analytically-minded liberals and
liberal egalitarians tend to call neutrality are of course sophisticated and
difﬁcult. See, e.g., Gaus (2010) and Quong (2010). I hope that my basic
point is robust across the various plausible views at stake in these debates
11. In a certain sense, my argument here may be an example of the
radical potential of a principle of formal equality explored by Jane Mans-
bridge (2005) in her “Cracking through Hegemonic Ideology: The Logic o
Formal Justice.”
omen in the United Kingdom (2011 Census, table 1), while there were
ss than 6,000 convictions for all sexual offences that year (Ministry of
stice 2013, 43, table Q4.1).
13. It seems unlikely that income inequalities of the sort seen in the
nited Kingdom are unavoidable, given that income inequality is much
wer in many other developed and seemingly stable and successful states.
ee OECD (2011).
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in. Combining neutrality and hierarchy in that way does not
treat those lives it condemns as gaining a fair return for their
acceptance of the political order, despite the necessity of that
acquiescence for the lives in the shadow of whose superi-
ority they must live. Once that order must be transparent
to those left at the wrong end of its hierarchies, it cannot
be acceptable to them. The order’s attempts at justiﬁcation
deny that the meagre return it provides to its worst-off
members is really worth having in spite of any identiﬁcation
they may have with it, at least in comparison to what others
get. In doing so, the regime undermines their conﬁdence
and only makes it more difﬁcult for them to achieve any-
thing they can see as signiﬁcant.
Non-intrinsic egalitarianism will be mandated then if the
harms it aims to avoid are associated with nonvoluntary and
encompassing hierarchies of the sort which prevent a po-
litical order from being reciprocal. In the United Kingdom at
least, it seems to me that the relevant hierarchies are sufﬁ-
ciently general, steep, and unavoidable. Around half the dif-
ference between Britons’ incomes appears to be determined
by differences between their parents’ income (d’Addio 2007,
32), while data on income by ethnicity and gender show
that white Britons earn more than members of every other
ethnic group and that typically men earn more than women
for doing the same work (Perfect 2013; Platt 2011). This is
to say nothing of systematic failures to respect or adequately
protect the rights of disadvantaged groups, so that less than
5% of rapes result in a conviction,12 and black Britons are
seven times more likely to be stopped and searched than their
white fellow citizens (Ministry of Justice 2011). An order that
systematically raises barriers against attempts to leave your
parents’ class, and which leaves women and members of
ethnic minorities poorer than white men cannot, in the ab-
sence of a theological or otherwise otherworldly explana-
tion for its continual privileging of white, middle and upper
class men, reasonably claim to offer anyone else a fair return
on their submission to it.13w
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Consequently, those whom the British political order
disdains and discounts may reasonably refuse to acknowl-
a political order has to constrain the levels of inequality in
it so as not to do too much damage to some of its mem-
Volume 77 Number 3 July 2015 / 689edge it as having a right to command them. Equally, vic-
tims of other societies’ similarly steep and unavoidable hi-
erarchies may do likewise. Giving up their authority over
themselves to those orders would be a submission to an
exploitative process which does not treat them as having
the same sort of claims as some of its other members. They
get little if anything back for what they put in, and since
their return is not a matter of divine command, this can
hardly be adequate. If a political order’s legitimation must
be transparent in Williams’s sense, then that order must,
if its legitimation is not to fail for many of its members,
also avoid status hierarchies of the sort non-intrinsic egal-
itarianism condemns. Realists, round here and now, need
to be pretty egalitarian—at least if Williams is right about
what round here and now is like.
Indeed, evidence from the United Kingdom’s last ma-
jor episode of social unrest supports the idea that a cer-
tain level of equality is a requirement of realist legitimacy
around here and now. A team of researchers from the LSE
interviewed hundreds of those involved in the riots of the
summer of 2011 which, at their peak, involved serious dis-
turbances in 22 of London’s 32 boroughs, as well as several
other cities across England (Lewis et al. 2011). They found
what they described as a “pervasive sense of injustice” (2011,
24). Whereas on average more than 90% of Britons describe
themselves as part of British society, barely half of the
alienated and marginalized interviewees did (25). The in-
terviewees, almost two-thirds of whom were from the poor-
est ﬁfth of council wards in the United Kingdom, complained
about joblessness, social exclusion, changes in government
policy that they felt demonstrated a lack of regard for them,
and a culture of conspicuous consumption that created and
then exploited desires for status they could not legally meet
(2011). They also had an overwhelmingly negative view of
the police. Interviewees were 8 times less likely to have a pos-
itive view of local police than Britons on average, and fre-
quently described them as “the biggest gang out there” (18).
This may be connected to 73% reporting having been stopped
and searched in the last year (19). Socially excluded and mar-
ginalized rioters apparently felt that they were disregarded
and mistreated by a political system, whose forces of law and
order then targeted them. It is easy to understand why they
would reject that system’s claim to authoritatively order their
social world by, for example, engaging in unrest which Lon-
don’s Metropolitan Police described as “unprecedented in
the capital’s history” (17).
Realists may not all be very happy about legitimacy re-
quiring a certain level of socioeconomic equality around here
and now. It may seem excessively moralistic to think thatThis content downloaded from 134.225.109.1
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adequate return on submission to authority. Yet there is
conceptual or theoretical afﬁnity between realism and egal-
itarian demands of this sort. In the same structural sense
that G. A. Cohen’s socialism is not political, realism itself is
built around an egalitarian demand, a demand for a certain
kind of respect. An order is only legitimate if it offers some
kind of explanation of why its massively structuring, coer-
cive power should be treated as authoritative rather than as
an unfortunately extremely successful, highly sophisticated
protection racket. People are entitled to reject coercion, to
treat it as an affront to their dignity and those who use it as
enemies, if some kind of justiﬁcation they can accept cannot
be given. That is itself an egalitarian commitment which,
for example, refuses to demand that people sacriﬁce them-
selves for the beneﬁt of others, which treats them as properly
authoritative over themselves, as reasonable when they re-
fuse to acquiesce in naked domination or exploitation by
their supposed political authorities. Both realism and non-
intrinsic egalitarianism focus on the importance of being
able to govern your own life, of a life lived from the inside
and not controlled by external forces. Given that, it is not
entirely surprising that realism most likely will, under cer-
tain conditions, require that political orders are egalitar-
ian or face losing their legitimacy for parts of their popu-
lation.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have argued that realism’s hostility to
contemporary political philosophy’s tendency to see itself
as a form of applied moral philosophy need to not extend
to contemporary political philosophy’s interest in distrib-
utive equality. First, I tried to show that realism is com-
patible with a certain kind of egalitarianism, that that kind
of egalitarianism can be generically political, even if ques-
tions remain about whether it is appropriate in the here
and now. Negative non-intrinsic egalitarianism does not re-
quire the suppression of conﬂicts of interest or of moral
disagreement to act as a basis for a political order and so can
be political in the way that realists require. I then moved on
to argue that, because of a particular set of conditions po-
litical legitimations seem to have to fulﬁl here and now,
that kind of egalitarianism may be required of political le-
gitimations here and now, that some contemporary po-
litical orders cannot rightly claim the allegiance of all their
members unless they reach some threshold of material equal-
ity. Those orders will seem exploitative to many of their
members, who will rightly see the hierarchies they erect and
sustain as depriving them of the chance to beneﬁt from the20 on Thu, 24 Sep 2015 05:10:14 AM
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order and so denying them a fair return on their submission
to it. As such, they will not be legitimate for those members.
Cohen, G. A. 2009. Why Not Socialism? Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
D’Addio, Anna Cristina. 2007. Intergenerational Transmission of Disad-
690 / Real Value of Equality Robert JubbMy discussion made it clear that both of these arguments
relied on quasi-empirical claims in the direction of whose
justiﬁcation I have at best gestured. First, Martin O’Neill’s
deep social fact, connecting avoiding various status harms
and humiliations with high levels of material equality, needs
to hold for non-intrinsic egalitarianism to be a coherent po-
litical theory. I believe that work like that of Marmot, and
Wilkinson and Pickett suggest that it does, but I am not a
social psychologist or epidemiologist, and so I cannot show
that it does. Second, and I assume more controversially,
drawing on Bernard Williams’s work, I claimed that mo-
dernity has a particular character and that this imposed
certain requirements of transparency on political legitima-
tions around here and now, at least for some values of around
here and now. There, beyond an appeal to Williams’s au-
thority among realist political theorists and philosophers in
particular, I can really only point to the plausibility of the
conclusions he, if not I, was able to draw from those claims.
I was also vague about exactly where the egalitarian thresh-
old I drew from Williams’s work ought to fall, avoiding
saying more than that the United Kingdom is below it. It
seems tome that these are the areas where further work needs
to be done. Realism has articulated a powerful and to my
mind compelling critique of the general tenor of much po-
litical philosophy. What remains is the question of with
what to replace it, of what political philosophers ought to
say instead, if indeed they should say anything. It is to issues
like the relationship between material equality and various
commonly accepted harms and the way our historical sit-
uation limits the available legitimations that our attention
should now be turning then.
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